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Practice and Procedure
By R. Neal Batson* and Ben F. Johnson, III**

I.

PERSONAL AND DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

This article opened last year with a discussion of McGovern v. American
Airlines, Inc.' and the principle that it is the plaintiff's burden to allege
and invoke federal jurisdiction. McGovern was undercut somewhat by the
1976 case of Skidmore v. Syntex Laboratories,Inc.2 Indeed, one dissenting
judge argued that the Fifth Circuit was permitting jurisdiction even
though the plaintiff had failed to make even a prima facie showing of
essential jurisdictional facts. The plaintiff, a Texas citizen, brought a
products-liability diversity action against one Delaware corporation and
one Panamanian corporation. The plaintiff, even after substantial discovery, was unable to demonstrate that either defendant had committed any
tort within Texas, an essential jurisdictional fact for the plaintiff to be able
to invoke the Texas long-arm statute. The manufacturer of the product
was not a party to the action. The Fifth Circuit said, nevertheless, that the
district court had acted "too drastically" in dismissing the plaintiff's action without prejudice. The plaintiff should be given a reasonable opportunity for additional discovery and for amendment of the complaint to
name the proper defendants, the court said. Although Skidmore reflects a
jurisdictional liberality inconsistent with McGovern, the Fifth Circuit may
have been reacting to what it saw as a corporate shell game. The decision
may have arisen from sympathy with the plaintiff's frustration in finding
which company in "the whole conglomerate of Syntex's" was really responsible for manufacturing the product.
The scope and limitations of Erie3 were explored in Conway v. Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.I The plaintiff, a remarried widow, brought a
wrongful-death action for the death of her first husband. Under Texas law,5
evidence of the remarriage was admissible. The federal district court at
* Partner in the law firm of Alston, Miller & Gaines, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A. (1963), LL.B
(1966), J.D. (1970), Vanderbilt University. Member of the Georgia Bar.
** Associate in the law firm of Alston, Miller & Gaines, Atlanta, Georgia. B.A. (1965),
Emory University; LL.B. (1968), J.D. (1969), Harvard University. Member of the Georgia
Bar.
1. 511 F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. 529 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1976).
3. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976).
5. TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4675a (Vernon Supp. 1976).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

trial, however, ruled that the defendant might not refer to the plaintiff's
remarriage. Reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit found that the
Texas statute was not merely a rule of evidence, but rather was a rule so
intertwined with Texas substantive law that the federal courts had to
follow the evidentiary rule to give full effect to Texas substantive policy.
The court held that the Texas evidentiary rule should have been followed
by the district court as part of the Texas wrongful death act.
On January 20, 1976, the United States Supreme Court decided the case
of Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer.6 The Court was faced with
a unique factual situation. A district judge had remanded a removed case
to the state court, stating that he had reviewed his civil docket and found
"that there is no available time in which to try the above-styled action in
the foreseeable future" and stating further that an adjudication of the case
on the merits would be expedited by a remand to the state court. Apparently the judge had issued similar orders in other cases. He conceded that
the case was one in which the defendants had a right to removal. In reviewing the district court's remand, the Supreme Court, however, was confronted with 28 U.S.C.A. §1447(d) which states, "An order remanding a
case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise .... ." The Supreme Court moved past the §1447(d)
hurdle by holding that §1447(d) should be interpreted in conjunction with
§1447(c), which provides that the district court shall remand the case
which has been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction." The
Supreme Court held that the prohibition on appellate review in §1447(d)
was applicable to any remand based on improvident removal or lack of
jurisdiction under §1447(c), but did not pose a bar if the district court remanded on some other basis. Since the district judge in Thermtron had
remanded even though admitting that the case was not one improvidently
removed and was not one over which the court lacked jurisdiction, appellate review was appropriate, the Supreme Court said, even in the face of
the §1447(d) prohibition. The Court's majority opinion in Thermtron
drew a strong dissent from Justices Rehnquist and Stewart and the Chief
Justice, who said the majority was ignoring an "express directive of Congress." 7
The Fifth Circuit was almost immediately confronted with a series of
actions involving the application of the Thermtron opinion. In the first two
6. 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
7. The dissenting opinion stated: "Finally, I perceive no justification for the Court's
decision to ignore the express directive of Congress in favor of what it personally perceives to
be 'justice' in this case. If anything is clear from the history of the prohibition against review,
it is that Congress decided that potential errors in individual cases did not justify permitting
litigants to challenge remand orders. To carry out its policy of avoiding further interruption
of the litigation of removed causes, properly begun in state courts ... Congress decided to
place final responsibility for implementation of its removal scheme with the district courts.
It is not for this Court to strike that balance anew." 423 U.S. at 360-361.
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cases,8 the court exercised commendable restraint. It said the removals to
the district court were improvident in the first instance, so §1447(d) barred
appellate review of the remand orders. This was, however, to change. In
In Re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,' the district court's finding that
a case had been removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction" had
been based upon a rather rigid interpretation of the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. The Fifth Circuit panel opinion stated the question to be whether
a district court may use the doctrine of judicial estoppel as a basis for
holding that a case was removed "improvidently and without jurisdiction"
within the meaning of §1447(c). The panel opinion answered that question
in the negative and gave only scant recognition to the §1447(d) proscription. The en banc court affirmed the panel opinion and added by way of
footnote the admonition that "this litigation should not be impeded with
any further efforts by the plaintiffs to avoid federal jurisdiction on insubstantial grounds."'" The §1447(d) proscription was not mentioned in the
en banc opinion. A dissenting opinion was filed by Judge Hill, who said it
was perfectly clear that, regardless of the merits of the district court's
action, its action was nevertheless taken pursuant to §1447(c). Hence
Thermtron barred appellate review, he said.' Southwestern Bell appears
to stand for the proposition that the proscription found in §1447(d) will not
be held to bar appellate review of a district court's remand order if that
order is based on what the Fifth Circuit determines to be an erroneous
application of the standards set out in §1447(c). The decision gives no
guidance on what might be left of §1447(d).
I.

FEDERAL-QUESTION JURISDICTION

In Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio, 2 the Fifth Circuit held that the
Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund of the City of San Antonio was not
a "person" suable under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983. This holding was not unexpected in light of previous Supreme Court decisions such as Monroe v.
Pape3 and Moor v. County of Alameda" and Fifth Circuit decisions such
as Adkins v. Duval County School Board.15Less predictable, however, was
8. London v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1976), and Robertson v.
Ball, 534 F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1976).
9. 535 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1976); en banc opinion at 542 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1976).
10. 542 F.2d at 298.
11. Judge Hill went on to say: "Thus, having crossed over the Jordan on the narrow bridge
seen to have been constructed by the Supreme Court in Thermtron, the narrow pathway has
been abandoned and we spread out all over the Promised Land! The court has, though not

authorized by Congress, reviewed an order remanding a case to the state court from which it
was removed." 542 F.2d at 300.
12. 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976).
13. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
14. 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
15. 511 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1975).
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the court's further holding that §1983 jurisdiction does not reach individual members of the Pension Board, either. The court found that the congressional intent which impels the "non-person" exclusion of §1983 actions against the board itself also compels the exclusion of actions against
the board's members. The court reasoned that if actions were allowed to
proceed against individual members of the board, the judicially created
bar against suing the board would be effectively eliminated. Any action
seeking restitution against a "non-person" like the board could just as
easily be framed in terms of a mandatory injunction against the officials
responsible for the fund from which restitution was sought. Several opinions dissenting from this portion of the court's opinion argued that the
majority opinion was inconsistent with earlier authority."6 Judge Thornberry's dissenting opinion pointed to future problems as well:
I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to draw distinctions
between such cases and the *one before us today. But I do contend that
these cases foreclose a distinction based upon the relatively clear and
logical basis of whether the relief sought will ultimately come from the
individual who is the immediate subject of the applicable order or the
governmental entity with which he is associated. Instead, the Courts will
be forced to wrestle, as has this Court, with the vague and elusive question
of whether an action is 'in reality' or 'in substance' one against a person
or a non-person. It seems to me that, at least as long as the earlier decisions mentioned remain good law, attempts to thwart indirect §1983 actions against governmental 'non-persons' will cause the Courts great difficulty and result in decisions that are lacking in both consistency and
logic.' 7
City of Safety Harbor v. Birchfield'8 held that a municipality was not a
"person" for purposes of 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 when it is a plaintiff suing as
a "person" who has been subjected "to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."

United States for and on Behalf of Mississippi Road Supply Co. v. H.
R. Morgan, Inc. ' was a case in which the Fifth Circuit was able to avoid
difficult questions concerning the scope of jurisdiction vested by the Miller
Act. 0 The court was able to pretermit the Miller Act jurisdictional questions by finding original jurisdiction in the district court based upon
seldom-used 28 U.S.C.A. §1352, which states: "The district courts-shall
16. Bradley v. School Board, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Davis v. Board of School Commissioners
of Mobile County, 526 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1976); United Farmworkers of Florida Hous. Project,
Inc. v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 489 F.2d 298 (5th
Cir. 1973); Harkless v. Sweeny Int. School Dist., 427 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1970).
17. 528 F.2d at 503-504.
18. 529 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1976).
19. 542 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
20. 40 U.S.C.A. §270a and §270b (1969).
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have original jurisdiction, concurrent with State courts, of any action on a

bond executed under any law of the United States."
Ill.

STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS

A statute-of-limitations case of particular interest to antitrust practitioners is Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. California-FloridaPlant Corp.2 This case
interpreted §5(b) of the Clayton Act,2" which states: "Whenever any civil
or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws ... the running of

the statute of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising
under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained
of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and
for one year thereafter .

. . ."

Yoder Brothers dealt with the application of

§5(b) in the context of a consent decree. Yoder Brothers and the United
States filed a stipulation containing a proposed consent decree on January
26, 1972. The consent decree was entered on March 15, 1972. The claim of
the California-Florida Plant Corporation was filed on April 12, 1973. Yoder
Brothers argued that the government suit ceased to pend on March 15, the
date that the consent decree was entered. California-Florida Plant Corporation contended that the government's proceeding did not cease to pend
until the 60-day statutory appeal period under the Expediting Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §29, had elapsed. The court reviewed Second Circuit authority
holding that the "pendency" of a government enforcement action continues until the expiration of the time to appeal from the final decree.Y The
Fifth Circuit distinguished the Second Circuit case, however, on the basis
that the final judgment followed full litigation. In a consent-decree context, the court pointed out, the scope of possible review is extremely narrow, since the only issues that may be raised on appeal are lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or facts which might vitiate the consent.,, The
court also pointed out that the outcome of the litigation is practically
certain at the time the consent decree is entered. Thus, the court held that
the government's action ceased to pend for §5(b) purposes on the date the
consent decree was entered.
Kittrell v.City of Rockwall" dealt with the question of the applicable
statute of limitations in a federal civil-rights action. The plaintiffs, who
were black, alleged violations of 42 U.S.C.A. §1981, §1982, §1983, §1985
and § 1988 as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. They alleged
21. 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1977).
22. 15 U.S.C.A. §16(i) (Supp. 1976).
23. Russ Togs, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 426 F.2d 850 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
878 (1970).
24. Martin Marietta Corp. v. FTC, 376 F.2d 430 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
923 (1967).
25. 526 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1976).
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that the city had entered and desecrated a cemetery where the plaintiffs'
kinsmen were buried. The alleged civil-rights violations occurred in the
spring of 1965. The defendants raised the defense of the statute of limitations. The Fifth Circuit noted that there was no federal statute of limitations applicable to civil rights actions and that, therefore, the most closely
applicable statute of the forum state controls. The court found that the
two-year Texas statute of limitations for suits alleging trespass and wrongful appropriation of property was most nearly applicable and governed
even in the federal civil rights action.
IV.

STANDING

Langendorf v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund26 presented an interesting question on standing. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin
construction of a non-denominational chapel on the campus of Newcombe
College, a part of the Tulane University system. They claimed that the
construction was a violation of the Establishment Clause of the U.S. Constitution. What made the plaintiffs' action factually interesting was that
the plaintiffs were collateral heirs of one James Rogers, who had left his
$300,000 estate to Tulane University for the construction of the chapel.
The plaintiffs' goal was to obtain the $300,000 estate for themselves. They
contended that the construction of the non-sectarian chapel by Tulane, a
state institution receiving state and federal funds, would result in the
misuse of public land and funds in violation of the First Amendment. The
plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed by the district court for lack of standing. The district court, citing Doremus v. Board of Education,2 said the
plaintiffs "do not allege, nor can they show, that the alleged unconstitutional action by Tulane of which they complain will affect them in any
way, other than as an abstract injury which they share in common with
all other taxpayers." The plaintiffs then turned candid and argued that
their interest was far from abstract, since it was well known that they had
"a direct, personal stake in the outcome; the proceeds of the Estate of
James Mitchell Rogers, which is well over $300,000.00. ' 21 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this contention, citing the Supreme Court decision in United
States v. Richardson." The Fifth Circuit held that the heirs might have a
collateral economic interest in the outcome of the suit, but since they
asserted a cause of action on which they could prevail only as taxpayers,
the requisite standing must come from their taxpayer status, not whatever
additional status they may have by virtue of being heirs. The court found
taxpayer status absent, since the plaintiffs as taxpayers were not asserting
26.
27.
28.
29.

528
342
528
418

F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1976).
U.S. 429 (1952).
F.2d at 1078.
U.S. 166 (1974).
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that any specific expenditure of federal funds was being carried out in
violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Flast v.
Cohen3Omade such an assertion a prerequisite to taxpayer standing. The
court noted that the plaintiffs in. Langendorf were not challenging any
specific federal statute or appropriation, but rather were trying to enjoin
the expenditure of a private legacy. The district court's dismissal for lack
of standing was affirmed.
"Except as otherwise authorized by law," 28 U.S.C.A. §516 states, "the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer
thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of the
Attorney General." Other statutes develop and expand on this principle. 31
The extent to which a federal agency can bring suits to enforce its orders
in the federal district courts without the aid or consent of the Attorney
General was the question posed in Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Southern Ry. Co. 2 The ICC had brought suit in the district court to enjoin
Southern Railway and the Central of Georgia Railroad from violating certain orders issued by the Commision. The Commission had not obtained
the consent or approval of the Attorney General to initiate the proceeding,
but it contended that it could proceed without the consent or approval of
the Attorney General pursuant to 49 U.S.C.A. §16(12), which states: "If
any carrier fails or neglects to obey any order of the commission other than
for the payment of money, while the same is in effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission or any party injured thereby, or the United States, by
its Attorney General, may apply to any district court of the United States
of competent jurisdiction for the enforcement of such order." (Emphasis
added.) The use of the word "or," the ICC argued, implied that the Commission could bring an action without the consent or approval of the Attorney General and created an exception "otherwise authorized by law" under
28 U.S.C.A. §516.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. The court held that a proper reading of the
statute simply permitted the Commission to request that the Attorney
General exercise the power to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts; it did
not permit the Commission to litigate without the consent or approval of
the Attorney General.
The Fifth Circuit relaxed traditional standing requirements in Thurston
v. Dekle. Thurston brought a class action on behalf of civil service employees of the City of Jacksonville attacking the constitutional adequacy
of pre-termination procedures that applied to nonprobationary city employees. Thurston had been temporarily suspended and then permanently
30.
31.
32.
33.

392 U.S. 83 (1968).
28 U.S.C.A. §519 (1968), 28 U.S.C.A. §2321 (Supp. 1977), 28 U.S.C.A. §2322 (1965).
543 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1976).
531 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976).
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discharged. The defendants were individual members of the Civil Service
Board and the director of Jacksonville's Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Thurston sought back pay as well as declaratory relief. The
Fifth Circuit found that the district court's award of back pay to Thurston
and other class members had to be reversed for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction, on the authority of Muzquiz v. City of San Antonio.34 This
presented the court with an anomalous situation: Thurston's only remedy
was back pay, and that was barred by Muzquiz. The declaratory relief
prayed for was appropriate to the class, but Thurston did not have standing to raise prospective issues on behalf of the class. The court said that
conventional standing analysis would lead to the reversal of the case, because no named plaintiff then had standing. The court was unaware of any
case in which a federal court had reached a substantive issue without a
named plaintiff who had standing at the time the action was filed. Upon
further analysis, however, the Fifth Circuit considered the fact that Thurston's lack of standing arose not because his standing had been mooted by
any fact occurring after the filing of his action, but rather because of a
subsequent legal interpretation - Muzquiz. The court reasoned that to
deny Thurston standing would be to exhalt form over substance. The usual
justification for the standing doctrine is that it insures that issues will be
briefed and argued with vigor since the litigants have a real stake in the
outcome. Throughout the Thurston litigation, all parties had briefed and
argued the case with vigor and until the Muzquiz opinion, had a real stake
in the outcome. The court concluded that it would not serve the ultimate
purpose of standing prerequisites to hold that the adversary context that
had truly prevailed throughout Thurston's proceeding was somehow lost
35
even before Thurston, or any other party, or the court knew it was gone.
The court further concluded that a dismissal based on lack of standing
would accomplish nothing more than to insure the relitigation of a controversy which had already been adequately litigated.
V.

THREE JUDGE COURTS

Costello v. Wainwright3l started as a complaint by prisoners about inadequate medical care in the Florida prison system. During the pendency of
the litigation, however, the suit began to focus on the more general problem of prison overcrowding. The district court found that adequate health
care was impossible because of the general overcrowding and issued a
detailed order requiring that the prison population be reduced. The defendants, the Director of the Division of Corrections and the Mental Health
34. 528 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1976). Muzquiz is discussed in the text accompanying notes 1217, supra.
35. 531 F.2d at 1270.
36. 539 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Director, contended that they could comply with the court's order only by
ignoring or violating Florida law requiring the acceptance of all prisoners
lawfully committed and the discharge of prisoners only in compliance with
statutory restrictions. Thus, the defendants argued that they were unable,
under Florida law, to maintain the Florida prison system in the manner
deemed constitutional by the federal court. The problem of a three-judge
court arose when the Fifth Circuit noted that, as the case changed from
one concerned simply with the medical care available to the prisoners to
one concerned with the more general issues of prison overcrowding, the
case also changed from one appropriate for a single judge to one requiring
a three-judge court, since the constitutionality of Florida statutes was then
called in to question. The court, therefore, vacated the district court's
order and remanded the case to allow the district court to determine what,
if anything, the defendants could legally do to alleviate the overcrowding
found to violate constitutional standards. If the district court should determine that the only way to eliminate the constitutional violation would be
to require the defendants to violate Florida law, then a three-judge court
should be convened.
The Costello opinion is now of little more than historical note. Congress
passed and, on August 12, 1976, the President signed Public Law 94-381,
which abolishes the requirement for three-judge courts in situations now
covered by 28 U.S.C.A. §2281 and §2282. 37 Thus, the institution of the
three-judge court has been substantially diminished. Indeed, a dissenting
opinion in Costello noted that "for any court to expand the jurisdiction of
three-judge courts at this particular moment ...seems. . . to be singularly
inappropriate." The dissenting opinion went on to state that "with such a
clear indication of congressional purpose to abolish three-judge courts in
this type of litigation completely, I cannot but dissent from a judgment by
this Court which expands the range of cases which must still consume the
time of three judges." 8
The institution of the three-judge court is undergoing significant modification in another area as well. The Supreme Court, under 28 U.S.C.A.
§1253, has mandatory appellate jurisdiction over appeal from certain decisions of three-judge courts." Two recent Supreme Court decisions,
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union" and MTM, Inc. v.
Baxley," have significantly limited the impact of §1253. In Jagnandanv.
37. 90 Stat. 1119 (1976).
38. 539 F.2d at 553, 554.
39. 28 U.S.C.A. §1253 (1966) provides: "Except as otherwise provided by law, any party
may appeal to the Supreme Court from an order granting or denying, after notice and hearing,
an interlocutory or permanent injunction in any civil action, suit or proceeding required by
an Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges."
40. 419 U.S. 90 (1974).
41. 420 U.S. 799 (1975). For a useful analysis of Gonzalez and MTM, see The Supreme
Court, 1974 Term: FederalJurisdiction& Procedure,89 HARv. L. Rav. 151, 182, 184 (1975).
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Giles,42 the Fifth Circuit accepted jurisdiction of an appeal which arguably
would have been subject to mandatory Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction before the Gonzalez and MTM decisions. In so doing, the Fifth Circuit
provided a helpful discussion and analysis of Gonzalez and MTM and
pledged its fidelity to "the historic congressional policy of minimizing the
mandatory docket of .. .[the Supreme Court] in the interest of sound
judicial administration." 3
VI.

CLASS AcTIONS

The Fifth Circuit dealt in some depth with the question of when a class
action plaintiff who purportedly represents the class "will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class."" In Sagers v. Yellow Freight
System, Inc., 5 the class representative, pursuant to a final decree, received
$6,000 as full compensation for lost wages, which he personally suffered as
a result of a company's discriminatory employment policies. The plaintiff
agreed not to press the back-pay claims of unnamed class members in
exchange for the defendant's promise to disclose nationwide its employment practices. Nothing in the final decree purported to adjudicate the
back-pay claims of the unnamed plaintiffs, and the parties agreed that the
unnamed class members would retain the right to bring separate actions
for back pay. In addition to the employer, certain union representatives
had been named as defendants. On appeal, the unions contended that the
lack of back-pay awards for the unnamed class members conclusively established that the named plaintiff had failed to adequately protect the
interests of the class. The Fifth Circuit noted that during the interim
between the final decree and the opinion on appeal, it had decided the case
of United States v. United States Steel Corp.,"6 which it construed as
holding that back-pay claims of individuals represented in a class action
must be asserted in that class action or be forever barred. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the result of the U.S. Steel decision was to vitiate part of the
understanding reached by the named plaintiff and the defendant employer. Therefore the Sagers case had to be remanded for a determination
of individual back-pay awards. The Fifth Circuit, in light of its U.S. Steel
decision, rejected the union's attack on the adequacy of the named plaintiff's representation of the class.
The U.S. Steel opinion provides a rather exhaustive discussion of the
procedures to be followed in the trial of an employment discrimination
case, which should be of particular interest to attorneys practicing in that
area.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

538 F.2d 1166, 1171 (5th Cir. 1976).
420 U.S. at 804.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
529 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1976).
520 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1975).
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Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc."' presents another factually interesting case on the question of adequacy of class representation. It was a
civil-rights action brought by a black union member on behalf of himself
and "other persons similarly situated." The plaintiff's union was all black.
A petition filed with the court on behalf of 204 of the approximately 230
members of the union stated in part: "We do not want [the plaintiff] ...
to act for us as a class in this suit and we do not want our Local Union
destroyed. We understand that if any of us want to we have the right to
join the white union or stay a member of the black union now." The Fifth
Circuit said it appeared that the views of a majority of the black union
members were antagonistic with those of the purported class representative. The court, therefore, concluded that the trial judge had not abused
his discretion in denying class-action status.
VII.

EXHAUSTION AND CERTIFICATION

Fulford v. Klein'8 presented an interesting question about exhaustion of
state remedies. The plaintiff had been convicted of murder and sentenced
to life imprisonment in Louisiana. While an appeal from his conviction was
pending before the Louisiana Supreme Court, the plaintiff brought an
action for damages against two assistant district attorneys and the superintendent of police. He alleged that they had violated his constitutional
rights by refusing to divulge exculpatory evidence which allegedly had
been in their possession. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice, stating that "since the petitioner challenged the legality of
his imprisonment, we should treat this as a habeas corpus petition and
require that Fulford exhaust his state remedies." On appeal to the Fifth
Circuit, the plaintiff said he was neither attacking the validity of his conviction nor seeking release from confinement, but rather was seeking
money damages under 42 U.S.C.A. §1983 in a civil proceeding. The plaintiff contended that he should not be forced to exhaust state appellate
procedures or to seek habeas corpus relief from his commitment before
bringing a civil damage action. The Fifth Circuit, relying on the authority
of Alexander v. Emerson,'9 disagreed. It cited the strong policy of comity
between state and federal judicial systems and said it would be the height
of disrespect for the administration of justice in Louisiana for a federal
court to determine whether a prisoner should recover damages for a denial
of constitutional rights while the state courts were considering an appeal
from the very criminal conviction that formed the basis of the federal civil
action. The court held that when the §1983 action involves the constitutionality of the petitioner's conviction, the federal court should require an
47.
48.
49.

528 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1976).
529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976).
489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973).
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exhaustion of state remedies. The Fifth Circuit did indicate that the district court might retain jurisdiction over the §1983 action during the state
proceeding if the statute of limitations of the §1983 action was about to
expire.
Certification statutes adopted in a number of states within the Fifth
Circuit permit the federal courts to refer certain questions of state law to
the state courts for resolution before determination of federal questions. In
United States v. 16.33 Acres of Land in the County of Dade,50 the Fifth
Circuit certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court and referred to
certification as a "marvelous device." In Floridav. Exxon Corp.,51 however,
the Fifth Circuit began to recognize that the certification procedure has
disadvantages. Perhaps the most important one is delay. The Fifth Circuit
reviewed previous certification cases and found that the delays had been
significant - in one case as much as 28 months. 52 In Exxon the court chose
not to use the certification procedure, because the case had already been
pending for more than two years. The court said:
In taking this action, we intend to cast no doubt on the general efficacy
of the certification process ....

Absolute certainty in judicial decisions,

as in other areas of human action, is a rare and expensive commodity. In
certification cases, unlike most which come before us, it is available to us,
since the Florida Supreme Court's word is final. But in this case, with the
law in this issue fairly clear, we find the price of certainty too high, in
terms of delay which may prejudice the plaintiff's rights to a speedy
resolution of the merits.1
VIII.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

In LeCompte v. Mr. Chip, Inc.,54 the Fifth Circuit dealt with the limits
of the district court's power under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to impose "such terms and conditions as the court deems
proper" in an order for voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff. The district
court had allowed the plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss his action "without
prejudice" upon the condition that plaintiff would not be entitled to relitigate his action until he preliminarily proved his case to the district court. 5
50. 537 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1976).
51. 526 F.2d 266, 276 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. Allen v. Estate of Carman, 446 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1971), on receipt of answers to
certification,486 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1973).
53. 526 F.2d at 276.
54. 528 F.2d 601 (5th Cir. 1976). Alvarado v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 528 F.2d 605 (5th
Cir. 1976), presented issues identical to those in LeCompte. Holding that LeCompte controlled, the court vacated and remanded.
55. The conditions attached by the trial court in granting plaintiff's dismissal were as
follows: (1) any subsequent suit must be filed in the same court; (2) plaintiff must show
extraordinary circumstances to justify reopening the case; and (3) plaintiff must make an
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The Fifth Circuit noted that a plaintiff cannot ordinarily appeal an order
of dismissal without prejudice and that only a dismissal with prejudice is
considered a final, appealable order." But the court examined the effect
of the LeCompte order rather than its language 57 and determined that
though the order was labeled a "dismissal without prejudice," it did not
have the effect of such an order. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, and
the court, after considering the kinds of conditions which can be imposed
upon a dismissal without prejudice," vacated and remanded the case to
the district court for a determination of whether imposition of the conditions was necessary to protect the defendant from prejudice.59
During the year the Fifth Circuit reviewed a number of cases dealing
with involuntary dismissals "with prejudice" under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These cases present a continuing "tug of
war" between the district court's legitimate power to achieve an orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases 0 and the Fifth Circuit's concern that
the harsh remedy of dismissal with prejudice should be resorted to in only
the most extreme situations in which there is a "clear record of delay or
contumaciouis conduct by the plaintiff."'"
In Graves v. KaiserAluminum & Chemical Co.,"2 the district court had
dismissed because of the failure of the plaintiff or his counsel to attend a
pretrial conference and file a timely proposed pretrial order. The Fifth
Circuit found an abuse of discretion and reversed. In so holding, the court
found no evidence that the plaintiff had engaged in dilatory tactics, that
he had failed to prosecute his case in anything but an orderly manner, or
that plaintiff's failure to comply with the district court's orders resulted
from any intentional misconduct. In finding no "clear record of delay or
contumacious conduct by the plaintiff," the Fifth Circuit indicated that
the district court should have invoked milder sanctions to achieve compliance with its orders and expedition of the proceedings.
affirmative demonstration to the court's satisfaction that a valid cause of action can be
maintained against defendants.
56. Durham v. Florida East Coast Ry., 385 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1967).
57. Carr v. Grace, 516 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1976).
58. Most cases decided under Rule 41(a)(2) have involved conditions such as the payment
of costs and attorney fees. American Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 317 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963).
59. A plaintiff's right to a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is not absolute, but is
within the sound discretion of the district court. The district court's order is reviewable only
for an abuse of that discretion. Diamond v. United States, 267 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1959). In
fashioning conditions to be imposed, it is the defendant's legitimate interests that should be
protected, and the court should impose only those conditions necessary to alleviate harm or
prejudice to the defendant.
60. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962); Flaska v. Little River Marine Constr. Co.,
389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1968).
61. Connolly v. Papachristid Shipping, Ltd., 504 F.2d 917, 920 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. 528 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Likewise, in Coon v. Charles W. Bliven & Co., Inc.,13 the Fifth Circuit
reversed a district court's dismissal for failure of the plaintiff's counsel to
appear at the calendar call. The court found that the failure to appear
resulted from counsel's confusion about instructions regarding the timing
of the calendar call and did not constitute the kind of deliberate disobedience warranting a dismissal of the action.
In Boazman v. Economics Laboratory, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit was confronted with a dismissal without prejudice for want of prosecution and
failure to follow orders of the court. Ordinarily, the court said, it would
apply a less stringent standard of review to dismissals without prejudice
because the plaintiff would be able to file his action again. But the statute
of limitations could prevent Boazman from refiling, and the court said the
standard of review should be the same as used when reviewing a dismissal
with prejudice." Applying the stricter standard to the facts of the case, the
Fifth Circuit found no "contumacious indifference to the court of the kind
we generally regard as requisite to the use of this severe sanction" 6 and
reversed.
In Ramsay v. Bailey, 7 the district court won one when the Fifth Circuit
affirmed a dismissal of an action with prejudice for want of prosecution.
Again the court said that while the dismissal power should be used sparingly and only when less drastic alternatives have been fully explored, the
exercise of this power is committed to the discretion of the trial court and
will be overturned only if there is abuse of that discretion. Here there was
evidence of a long pattern of conduct which amounted to a want of prosecution. All the factors necessary to support a dismissal, including significant
periods of total inactivity by the plaintiff," repeated warnings that dismissal would result from continued failure to proceed properly, and several
failures to obey rules and court orders, 9 were present in Ramsay. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court was justified in
dismissing the action under Rule. 41(b).
In Taylor v. Gibson,7 the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of an in forma pauperis civil-rights complaint for monetary damages. In reversing, the court noted that pro se prisoner complaints are to
63. 534 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1976).
64. 537 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1976).
65. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit followed its earlier decision in Pond v. Braniff Airways,
Inc., 453 F.2d 347 (5th Cir. 1972), which held that when the dismissal is without prejudice
but the applicable statute of limitations bars further litigation, the standard of review of the
district court's dismissal should be the same as used when reviewing a dismissal with prejudice.
66. 537 F.2d at 213.
67. 531 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1976).
68. See Murrah v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 480 F.2d.613 (5th Cir. 1973).
69. See Delta Theatres, Inc. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 398 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1968).
70. 529 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1976).
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be read in a liberal fashion and should not be dismissed unless it appears
beyond all doubt that the prisoner could prove no set of facts under which
he would be entitled to recover. Accordingly, pro se prisoner complaints
must be read by "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers," 7' and the district court-may dismiss an in forma pauperis case
only "if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.""
IX.

PLEADING'

In Dupuy-Busching General Agcy. v. Ambassador Insurance Co.," the
Fifth Circuit was confronted with an interpretation of conflicting provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act 7' and their interaction with Rule 13(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiff brought an action in
a Mississippi state court to stay the arbitration of a commission's dispute
with defendant over a contract requiring arbitration in New Jersey. The
action was removed to federal court, and the defendant filed a counterclaim asserting its right under the Federal Arbitration Act to have arbitration in New Jersey in accordance with the contract. The district court
found that the contract was one related to interstate commerce and entered an order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in New
Jersey in accordance with the contract. An appeal followed, and the Fifth
Circuit affirmed. The court held that if a party seeking to avoid arbitration
brings a suit for injunctive relief in a district other than that in which
arbitration is to be performed under the contract, the party desiring arbitration must assert its right to have arbitration performed in accordance
with the contract terms. Furthermore, this contractual right is a compulsory counterclaim which, according to Federal Rule 13(a), must be raised
lest it be barred in any subsequent suit under the principles ofres judicata.
71.

Id. at 714.

72. Id. Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir. 1976), provides a detailed discussion
of principles which should apply in considering the dismissal of an in forma pauperis prisoner
complaint.
73. 524 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. §4 (1970), has conflicting provisions requiring
arbitration "in accordance with the terms of the contract" but "in the district in which the
petition is filed." In Dupuy, the Fifth Circuit held that if the plaintiff is the party opposing
arbitration and the defendant insists on arbitration at the place specified by the contract
rather than in the district where the action is brought, the court should direct that the
arbitration be held at the situs specified by the contract. But see Econo-Car International,
Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 499 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1974), in which the court found that
the express venue provision in §4 of the Federal Arbitration Act took precedence over a
provision in the contract requiring that arbitration be held in another district and, accordingly, the court could order arbitration only within its own district. The Fifth Circuit distinguishes Econo-Car from Dupuy on the ground that the plaintiff in Econo-Carwas the party
seeking arbitration rather than resisting it and the bringing of the action constituted a waiver
of the contract provision requiring arbitration in another district. Continental Grain Co. v.
Dant & Russell, Inc. 118 F.2d 967 (9th Cir. 1941), was likewise distinguished.
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In Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh,5 the court was presented
with the question of whether a Georgia statute7 was an affirmative defense
within the meaning of Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."
The court said that whether a-matter is an affirmative defense is to be
determined by looking to the substantive law of the state where the federal
district court sits.78 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held that the statute is
an affirmative defense that must be set forth in a responsive pleading or
else it will be waived.7"
National Surety Corp. v. Charles Carter & Co.,M presented a thorny
third-party practice question under Rule 14. The action began as a simple
proceeding by a subcontractor's bonding company against the general contractor to recover sums due under the subcontract. The subcontractor itself
then intervened, the defendant general contractor filed a counterclaim
against it, and, in turn, the subcontractor filed a third-party complaint
against another party. The third-party defendant moved to dismiss the
subcontractor's third-party complaint on the ground that the
subcontractor-intervenor did not qualify as a "defending party" under
Rule 14.1' The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the
motion to dismiss. It held, in effect, that a defendant-in-counterclaim is a
"defending party" and may third-party anyone "who is or may be liable
to him for all or part of the plaintiffs [plaintiff-in-counterclaim] claim
against him."
In McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 82 the Fifth Circuit was
presented with a case of first impression regarding the interrelationship
between Rule 15 and Rule 21.s1The plaintiff sought to amend its complaint
75. 530 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. GA. CODE ANN. §105-303 (1968), which provides: "no action shall be sustained for
deceit in representation to obtain credit for another, unless such misrepresentation is in
writing, signed by the party charged therewith."
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c). sets forth certain defenses which must be plead affirmatively and
then concludes: "and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense."
78. Norman M. Morris Corp. v. Weinstein, 466 F.2d 137, 142 (5th Cir. 1972); Seal v.
Industrial Elec., Inc., 362 F.2d 788, 789 (5th Cir. 1966).
79. The court concluded that GA. CODE ANN. §105-303 (1968) functions in the same way
as the Georgia statute of frauds, GA. CODE ANN. §20-401 (1965), which has been held by the
Georgia courts to constitute an affirmative defense. See GA. CODE ANN. §81A-108(c) (Supp.
1976); Scott v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc., 120 Ga. App. 819, 172 S.E.2d 365 (1969).
80. 539 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1976).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides, in part, that "a defending party, as a third-party
plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him." Rule
14(b) provides that a plaintiff (which is held to include an intervenor) against whom a
counterclaim has been asserted "may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so."
82. 526 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1976).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) provides that "at any time before a responsive pleading is
served," a party may "amend his pleading once as a matter of course." Rule 21, regarding
misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, provides that "[plarties may be dropped or added by
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before the filing of any responsive pleading by adding certain defendants
as additional parties. The plaintiff did not obtain leave of court to add
these parties, but proceeded as a matter of course. The question presented
was whether the plaintiff was free to proceed as a matter of course under
Rule 15(a) or was required to obtain leave of court as required by Rule 21.
Reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that Rule 15 takes
precedence over Rule 21 and leave of court is not necessary."s
X.

PARTIES, JOINDER AND INTERPLEADER

In Ralli-Coney, Inc. v. Gates,85 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of a party to preserve diversity jurisdiction. In finding
that the trial court acted within the bounds of sound discretion and within
its authority under Rule 2 1,8 the court considered the four tests under Rule
19(b) to determine whether the party was indispensable to the lawsuit.87
The court held in Kimball v. FloridaBar" that a party does not waive
the defense of failure to join an indispensable party under Rule 19(b) by
neglecting to raise it. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for a
determination of whether certain parties should have been joined under
the provisions of Rule 19. The court said such an objection can be raised
at any time, even by a reviewing court on its own motion."
In Murphy v. Travelers Insurance Co., ° the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's holding that to qualify for statutory interpleader under 28
U.S.C.A. §1335, the insurer stakeholder was only required to deposit with
the court the base amount of the policy and was not required to deposit
monies for any claims by the defendants for attorney fees and statutory
order of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action
and on such terms as are just."
84. In the opinion the court notes that its holding in McLellan was presaged by Hines v.
Delta Air Lines, 461 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1972). "There, in passing on an amendment adding
Florida Airlines as a party, we did not turn to Rule 21 but to Rule 15 and relied upon the
provision in the second sentence of Rule 15(a) that 'leave shall be freely given when justice
so requires."' 526 F.2d at 873.
85. 528 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1976).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 states in part: "Parties may be dropped or added by order of the
court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such
terms as are just."
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b) provides in part: "The factors to be considered by the court
include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in
the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth,
whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder."
88. 537 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1976).
89. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 109-112 (1968);
Haby v. Standard Oil & Gas Co., 225 F.2d 723, 724 (5th Cir. 1955).
90. 534 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1976).
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penalties. The court noted that although the deposit requirement is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit under the interpleader statute, payment
of the face amount of the policy proceeds into the court had long been held
sufficient. 9 1 In addition, the court found that although the interpleader
claim was predicated on 28 U.S.C.A. §1335, it appeared that interpleader
would also be permissible under Rule 22, which does not require a deposit.
XI.

DISCOVERY

In San Antonio Telephone Co. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 2 the court affirmed the district court's imposition of a civil contempt
sanction against a witness and his counsel for failure to comply with the
court's order to appear, testify and produce documents in discovery proceedings in accordance with the command of a subpoena duces tecum. In
their appeal, the contemnors excused their conduct only by showing that
they expected to obtain a stay of the order either from the trial court or
from the Fifth Circuit pending appeal. This will not do. Orders and judgments of courts are to be complied with promptly. "If a person to whom a
court directs an order believes that order is incorrect the remedy is to
appeal, but, absent a stay, to comply promptly with the order pending
3
appeal."

XII.

TRIAL

The use of special verdicts and interrogatories pursuant to Rule 49 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure continues to get considerable attention
from the Fifth Circuit.
Industries, Investments, Etc. v. Panelfab InternationalCorp." provides
a helpful discussion of the use of a general verdict accompanied by written
91. Ross v. International Life Ins. Co., 24 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1928). In Murphy, the court
noted that the "preferred practice" of requiring the stakeholder to deposit only the disputed
property he has in his possession even though it might be less than is claimed by the defendants has been the rule in the Fifth Circuit. See Austin v. Texas-Ohio Gas Co., 218 F.2d 739,
744-45 (5th Cir. 1955). In this regard, the court said: "28 U.S.C.A. §1335(a) refers to 'money
or property' in the 'custody or possession' of the party seeking interpleader. The plain language of the statute clearly refers to tangible property interests or interests evidenced by a
'note, bond, certificate, policy of insurance' or other similar intangible document of definite,
ascertainable value. An inchoate, uncertain claim for attorney's fees or chose in action asserted against the general assets of a party rather than specific, identifiable 'property' is not
a proper subject for interpleader relief. Adopting appellant's reasoning would not only compel
reversal of this case, it would unduly broaden federal interpleader jurisdiction to include
virtually any contingent or inchoate claim which might ultimately be the subject of litigation." 534 F.2d at 1159.
92. 529 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1976).
93. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975).
94. 529 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1976).
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interrogatories under Rule 49(b). Affirming the district court, the Fifth
Circuit found that the "tricky business" of using written interrogatories
followed by a general verdict pursuant to Rule 49(b), rather than submitting only written questions upon each issue of fact, proved harmless in that
case, since the general verdict was not inconsistent with the answers to the
written interrogatories.""
In another decision, Blackwell v. Cities Service Oil Co.," the Fifth Circuit outlined the alternatives available to the district judge if the answers
to the interrogatories are inconsistent with the general verdict. The court
said that the district judge either may enter judgment in accordance with
the answers and notwithstanding the general verdict, may return the jury
for further consideration of its answers and verdict, or may order a new
trial. 7 The district judge may not enter judgment on a general verdict
inconsistent with the answers to the interrogatories." In Blackwell, the
general verdict of negligence was inconsistent with the jury's answers to
the written interrogatories. The Fifth Circuit, reversing the district court
and remanding, held that the defendant's motion for a new trial should
have been granted.
In Labit v. Santa Fe Marine, Inc.," the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's refusal to grant the "missing witness" instruction. The "missing
witness" had been in the courthouse during the entire trial, since he was
listed as a witness by the plaintiff, and his deposition had been taken
beforehand. Moreover, the plaintiff's attorney was allowed to comment in
closing argument on the defendant's failure to call this witness. Under
these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit found that it was not error to refuse
to instruct the jury that it could infer that the witness' testimony would
have been unfavorable to the defendant. The court said any inference from
the party's failure to call a witness equally available to both parties is
impermissible.'0 The court also noted that the requested instruction did
not follow the form approved in the Fifth Circuit, which specifically identi95. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) permits the court to "require a jury to return only a special
verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact." This approach helps
obviate the inconsistencies which may result where a general verdict is accompanied by
answers to written interrogatories under Rule 49(b). Wolfe v. Virusky, 470 F.2d 831, 837 (5th
Cir. 1972); Swann v. Huttig Sash & Door Co., 436 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1970); Hatfield v.
Seaboard Air Line R.R., 396 F.2d 721, 724 (5th Cir. 1968).
96. 532 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1976).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b).
98. Wolfe v. Virusky, 470 F.2d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1972).
99. 526 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. In Labit, the court noted that while its cases addressing the question of "equal
availability" refer to something more than physical accessability, United States v. Chapman,
435 F.2d 1245 (5th Cir. 1970), they do not require the district court to articulate the reasons
for its refusal to permit the inference. Compare East-West Towing Co. v. National Marine
Serv., Inc., 417 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1969), with Stewart v. United States, 418 F.2d 1110, 111415 (1969).
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fies the potential witness to which the inference is appropriate.'0 ' Furthernecessarily
more, the propriety of giving a "missing witness" instruction is 02
a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
Manchack v. S/S "Overseas Progress" 03 is important not so much for its
holding as for its discussion of the appropriate role of the trial judge in the
conduct of a jury trial. The Fifth Circuit said:
The trial judge is entrusted with broad discretionary powers to secure a
fair and unbiased administration of justice. In a trial by jury the judge is
not a mere moderator; he is an administrator charged with the proper
conduct of the trial. His participation in the trial of the case is a matter
resting largely within his own discretion. He may interrogate the witnesses
to clarify their testimony, analyze and comment upon the evidence, control and correct inflammatory remarks of counsel, and make suggestions
to counsel as to the course to be pursued in the case: all provided his
attitude is not one of partisanship.' 4
The Fifth Circuit concluded that a number of questions propounded by the
district judge did not prejudice the appellant.
In Response of Carolina,Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 05 the Fifth Circuit considered a bifurcation order in an antitrust action brought pursuant
to §4 of the Clayton Act.'1e Liability in an antitrust action of this nature
includes both-violation and causation and the damages must be causally
linked to the violations. Because this "dividing line" is so difficult to draw,
the court said, separate trials of liability and damages pursuant to Rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure must be approached with
trepidation. Accordingly, the court said that
the use of this trial procedure must be grounded upon a clear understanding between the court and counsel of the issue or issues involved in each
phase and what proof will be required to pass from one phase to the next.
The trial court must be careful as well as flexible in its rulings on the
admissibility of evidence under a bifurcation order. Simply because evidence contains numbers or amounts, for example, should not result in its
exclusion in Phase I [the trial on liability]. If causation or fact of damage
cannot be shown without some reference to amount of damage, bifurcation
should not prevent the reference. 07
On appeal the franchisees claimed that prejudice resulted from the bifurcation order, though they failed to object in the district court. Noting that
101. United Broadcasting Co. v. Armes, 506 F.2d 766, 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
102. Burgess v. United States, 440 F.2d 226, 234 (5th Cir. 1970).
103. 524 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 919, quoting Curd v. Todd-Johnson Dry Docks, 213 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1954).
105. 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976).
106. 15 U.S.C.A. §15 (1973).
107. Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 286 (5th Cir. 1975).
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it will not take notice of error.raised for the first time on appeal except
"where the interest of substantial justice is at stake,"''0 the court left the
franchisees where it found them.
In Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel,0 1 the Fifth Circuit held that when
the district court consolidated hearings on a preliminary and permanent
injunction under Rule 65(a)(2), the plaintiff waived its right to a jury trial
on the issue of liability and acquiesced in the trial of the matter without a
jury. The court said that, in the absence of a waiver, the proper procedure
would be for the district court to hear the preliminary injunction, try the
legal issues before a jury, and then hear the permanent injunction." '
The case of Lewis v. S. S. "Baune"' contains an interesting discussion
of the distinction between civil and criminal contempt and the question
whether a court will enjoin the efforts of parties to a lawsuit to settle that
suit behind the backs of their counsel. The court found that the contempt
in Lewis was civil.
The Fifth Circuit noted that courts have consistently held that parties
have a right to settle or compromise their litigation without the knowledge
or consent of their counsel and that clauses in a contract between the
attorney and the client which prohibit such activity are generally held to
be against public policy. The court stopped short of saying that parties
have an absolute right to settle behind the backs of their counsel. The court
recognized that parties do not have a right to obtain a settlement through
duress, harassment, or overbearing conduct and that courts may enjoin the
108. 534 F.2d 639 (5th Cir. 1976).
109. If a determination of the equitable issues would be conclusive as to the legal issues,
then the legal issues should be tried first in order to preserve the right to jury trial. Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). The Fifth Circuit holding in Southland
Reship follows other circuits holding to the same effect. National Family Ins. Co. v. Exchange
Nat'l Bank, 474 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1973); Smith v. Cushman Motor Works, Inc., 178 F.2d
953 (8th Cir. 1950).
110. 534 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1976).
111. The court noted that when a person is adjudged to be in contempt of court, it must
first be determined whether the nature of the proceeding is civil or criminal, i.e., whether the
contempt is a civil or criminal one. The proceedings by way of criminal contempt are to
punish defiance of judicial authority, -whereas civil contempt serves either to compel obedience to the court order or to compensate the litigant for injuries suffered because of the
disobedience. Norman Bridge Drug Co. v. Banner, 529 F.2d 822, 827 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, if
a person is held in criminal contempt for violating a restraining order, the fact that the order
is later set aside as incorrect will not affect the judgment of contempt, the purpose being
vindication of the court's authority. United States v. United Mineworkers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947). A judgment of civil contempt, however, being remedial in nature, must stand or fall
with the validity of the order, and the opposing party should be compensated only if he was
entitled to the order. United States v. United Mineworkers, Norman Bridge Drug Co. v.
Banner. The court also said that the trial court's denomination of the proceeding as civil
contempt is not conclusive, but that the court's own characterization of its proceedings is one
factor to be considered in determining the character of the contempt. Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 124 (5th Cir. 1968).
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harassment or repeated invasions of privacy. Here, however, the injunction
did not speak to such conduct but prohibited the appellant-defendant from
"discussing, directly or indirectly, settlement ... with the plaintiffs" and
from "contacting, communicating, or in any way interfering with the
attorney-client relationship." In short, the district court enjoined a settlement between the parties, however amicably reached, if the claimant's
attorneys were not consulted. The Fifth Circuit found this restraint too
sweeping and reversed.
XIII.

APPEALABILITY, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, RES JUDICATA.

AND POST-JUDGMENT REVIEW

United States v. 'A " Manufacturing Co." involved an application of 28
U.S.C.A. §1292(a)(2)"3 and orders of a district court requiring the sale of
assets and confirming the sale of the assets. The court held the orders to
be appealable interlocutory orders under §1292(a)(2).
Taylor v. Sterrett"' applied Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that
upon a decision by the court granting . . relief, . . . that court shall
promptly approve the form of the judgment, and the clerk shall thereupon
enter it. Every judgment shall be set forth on a separate docket. A judgment is effective only when so set forth....
The appeal in Sterrett was from an order of court, rather than from a
separate judgment. The Fifth Circuit held that the order was not appealable, since there was no "separate document."
Rule 54(b) continued to be the subject of interpretation. A number of
appeals were dismissed.for failure of the order appealed from to contain
the required Rule 54(b) language."' Schexnaydre v. Travelers Insurance
Co. 116 presented the reverse of the usual Rule 54(b) dismissal. The district
court had made the Rule 54(b) findings in a case in which there was only
one defendant after. it had directed entry of an order dismissing one, but
112. 541 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1976).
113. 28 U.S.CA. §1292(a)(2) (1966) states: "The courts of appeals.shall have jurisdiction
of appeals from:- Interlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up
receiverships or to take steps to accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or
other disposals of property .... "
114. 527 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1976).
115. Johnson v. McDole, 526 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1976); Bailey v. McCann, 539 F.2d 501
(5th Cir. 1976); Hepperle v. Southern Methodist Univ., 526 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir. 1976). The
Rule 54(b) language referred to is: "When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no
just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."
116. 527 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1976).
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not all, of the plaintiff's possible theories of recovery. The Fifth Circuit
held that the court's order of dismissal was not a final order within the
meaning of Rule 54(b), because a single plaintiff may appeal an order
made final under Rule 54(b) only if multiple claims are involved. The court
said true multiplicity was not present when a plaintiff merely presents
alternative theories by which the same set of facts might give rise to a
single liability. Therefore, the court found that the case was not appealable, even though the district court had made the Rule 54(b) findings.
O'Donnell v. Latham"7 held that the Rule 54(b) language was not necessary in order for there to be interlocutory appealability in admiralty cases.
The court cited 28 U.S.C.A. §1292(a)(3), which allows appeal to the courts
of appeal from "interlocutory decrees of. .. district courts ... determining
the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in which appeals
from final decrees are allowed." The court cited Supreme Court authority
for the proposition that Rule 54(b) "does not supersede any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction.""'
Drewett v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. is a case of interest to lawyers
preparing appeals. A party on appeal included in the appendix and supplemental appendix or his briefs material which was unnecessary to the issues
on appeal and which was not cited in the briefs on appeal. The court
determined that if a party insists on the inclusion of extraneous material,
he should be taxed with the costs of printing the extraneous portions of the
appendix or supplemental appendix regardless of the outcome of the appeal.
The Fifth Circuit reiterated in 1976 that a party confronted with a motion for summary judgment may not simply stand on its pleadings. In
Golden Oil Co. v. Exxon Co.,""0 the court stated: "Pleadings will not suffice
to defer the evil day, and the opposing party, facing such a situation, may
not choose to wait until trial to develop claims or defenses relevant to the
summary judgment motion." If a party stands on his pleadings and does
not file responsive affidavits or other materials sufficient to create a genuine dispute of fact, the movant likely will prevail. In Solomon v. Houston
CorrogatedBox Co.,"2 ' the Fifth Circuit affirmed the grant of "one of the
more unusual species of judgments in the judicial system, the granting of
summary judgment in an antitrust case." The court noted that summary
judgment is not generally favored in antitrust cases,' = but held that the
policy of sparing use of summary procedures in antitrust cases was, nevertheless, "no warrant for every plaintiff who can draft an antitrust com117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

525 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976).
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 438 (1956).
539 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1976).
543 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1976).
526 F.2d 389 (5th Cir. 1976).
Clark v. United Bank, 480 F.2d 235 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973).
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plaint, no matter how groundless or improbable its allegations, to force his
claim to trial despite its deficient factual underpinnings."'2 The Fifth
Circuit indicated its hope that its decision would promote efficient judicial
administration.
In Janelie v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. 24 the Fifth Circuit continued to
add to the confusion concerning whether, in a diversity action, state law
or federal law controls the determination of what constitutes res judicata.
The court stated unequivocally that "Georgia law controls this action as
to what constitutes res judicata."' 25
Rule 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits clerical mistakes in judgments to be corrected, even after docketing in the appellate
court. Warner v. City of Bay St. Louis' 21 dealt with the question whether
Rule 60(a) allows the court of appeals to increase the interest rate applicable on a judgment from 6% to 8% to comply with a change in the applicable
state law."2 7 The Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 60(a) was useful to
correct only clerical mistakes and not substantive errors. The court concluded that changing the interest rate, even in response to a change in state
law, was not the sort of error encompassed by Rule 60(a). The court did
indicate, however, that if the appellee desired to seek an amendment to
the judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b), he could, of course, make such a
motion in the district court.
Lairsey v. Advance A brasives Co. ,2 1 provides a good discussion of the use
of Rule 60(b) in situations such as the one presented in the Warner case.
In Lairsey, the applicable Georgia law regarding actions which might be
brought under strict-liability tort theories was modified after a judgment
based on the pre-existing law had been entered in the district court. The
district court judgment had been on appeal to the Fifth Circuit for approximately four months when a Rule 60(b)(1) motion, pointing out the change
in the Georgia law, was filed in the district court. The district court held
that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within the period
allowed for perfecting a timely appeal. The Fifth Circuit, however, held
that the motion was timely made and remanded the case to the district
court for consideration of the Rule 60(b)(1) motion. Rule 60(b) permits
such a motion "within a reasonable time." The Fifth Circuit, eschewing
any fixed definition of what constituted a "reasonable time" for purposes
of Rule 60(b), noted that the rule itself addressed the issue by placing an
123.
124.

Murdoch v. City of Jacksonville, 361 F. Supp. 1083, 1086-1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
524 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir. 1975).
125. See Batson & Johnson, Practice and Procedure, 1975 Fifth Circuit Survey, 27 MFR.
L. REv. 927, 963-964 (1976), and its discussion of Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d
710 (5th Cir. 1975), and Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975).
126. 526 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1976).
127. Miss. CODE ANN. §75-17-7 (Supp. 1975).
128. 542 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1976).
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outside limit of one year on such motions. The court found that "however
simplicity to achieve
significant simplicity is, Rule 60 itself sacrifices some
2
greater equity through the 'reasonable time' test.'
In Rosch v. Kelly, 0 the Fifth Circuit held that a judgment which had
been allowed to become dormant in its state of rendition was entitled to
neither entry nor enforcement in another state under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. In Vandervoort, Sams, Anderson, Alper & Post, P.A. v.
Vandervoort,"I the Fifth Circuit held that a state statute permitting attacks on judgments based on fraud did not permit attacks on those judgments in other jurisdictions. The court held that while Florida Rule
1.540(b) 3 2 would provide a means for attack on the Florida judgment in a
Florida court, it was unavailable to attack the Florida judgment in a Texas
diversity action brought under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
129. Id. at 932.
130. 527 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1976).
131. 529 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1976).
132. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.540(b) provides in part: "On motion and upon such terms as are
just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, decree,
misrepresentation or.other
order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud .
"
misconduct of an adverse party ..

